Amir Mohammad Emami; Abdolrasoul Kashfi
Volume 11, Issue 2 , December 2023, , Pages 139-168
Abstract
The problem of evil and its relation to theism is a significant philosophical issue that has been discussed from ancient times to the contemporary period. Bruce Reichenbach is one of the contemporary philosophers of religion who has studied the issue in its various aspects. He explores different accounts ...
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The problem of evil and its relation to theism is a significant philosophical issue that has been discussed from ancient times to the contemporary period. Bruce Reichenbach is one of the contemporary philosophers of religion who has studied the issue in its various aspects. He explores different accounts of the argument from the logical or deductive argument from evil to the evidential or probabilistic accounts. In response to the probabilistic argument from evil, he develops a theodicy of moral evils and a theodicy of natural evils. According to this theodicy of natural evils, called “Natural Laws Theodicy,” natural evils are necessary by-products of the operation of natural laws in the world. Reichenbach sees natural laws as necessary conditions of human freedom and moral agency, which are considered essential to account for moral evils in the world. The supposition used here is the superiority of worlds consisting of moral agents who act freely and produce a significant amount of moral good. In this way, Reichenbach’s theodicy of natural evils is based on his theodicy of moral evils. However, this theodicy faces a number of potential objections, which Reichenbach mentions as well. The severest challenge arises from the conceivability of worlds without natural evils or containing fewer natural evils in comparison with the current world. It might be argued that law-governed worlds that do not contain evils or contain fewer evils compared to the actual world are conceivable, and since conceivability entails possibility, such worlds are possible. Consequently, the Natural Laws Theodicy fails to explain the necessity of the natural evils in the actual world to achieve a greater good; namely, the possibility of moral agency and human freedom. While Reichenbach addresses this issue in brief, the aim of this paper is to explore the problem in more depth with due consideration to broader epistemic and metaphysical frameworks in contemporary philosophy. In this regard, David Chalmers’ view on conceivability and possibility is taken into account to assess the validity of the potential objection to the Natural Laws Theodicy and also Reichenbach’s response to it. Chalmers carefully explores various types of conceivability and their relation to different kinds of possibility in his criticism of materialism, which he does by arguing for dualism in the form of an argument from conceivability. In brief, he argues that conceivability comes in a variety of forms, including positive/negative, prima facie/ideal, and primary/secondary conceivabilities. From the combination of these types, there are totally more than eight types of conceivability in Chalmers’ view. Nevertheless, he believes that only specific types of conceivability entail the metaphysical possibility that is required for arguments about the ontological nature of the mind, for instance. In this research, Reichenbach’s theodicy is developed and his answer to the potential objection of the conceivability of worlds without evil, or worlds containing fewer evils compared to the actual world, is evaluated using Chalmers’ theory on the conditions of conceivability-possibility entailment. From the various types of conceivability that Chalmers identifies, it will be explored that the law-governed worlds without natural evils or worlds containing fewer evils compared to the actual world are in what sense if any, conceivable. In the next step, based on Chalmers’ accounts of conceivability-possibility entailment, it will be concluded if the possibility of such worlds could be validly deduced from their conceivability. Moreover, Reichenbach’s objections to the argument from the conceivability of law-governed worlds without natural evil will be assessed in accordance with Chalmers’ theory on the relation of conceivability to possibility. As the outcome, it will be demonstrated that some of Reichenbach’s solutions are not entirely plausible and do not succeed in defeating the argument as they do not meet the standards set by Chalmers. Nevertheless, some of his other objections could be developed using the same framework to defeat the argument but in a weaker sense. Consequently, Bruce Reichenbach’s Theodicy of Natural Laws could be partially defended against the challenge of the conceivability of law-governed worlds without natural evils by the conditions of conceivability-possibility entailment set by David Chalmers. This research sets the ground for further research on this theodicy and similar ones that in one way or another relate to the issue of arguing from conceivability to possibility. It opens up the opportunity to take into account theories developed by Chalmers as well as other contemporary philosophers and metaphysicians who have explored different dimensions of the subject to give the investigations regarding the problem of evil and other issues in philosophy of religion more depth and precision.
Narges Karimi Vaghef; Abdolrasoul Kashfi; MohammadReza Bayat
Volume 10, Issue 2 , March 2022, , Pages 131-154
Abstract
The contradiction between divine “omnipotence” and “omnibenevolence” is a major debate in philosophy of religion studies. Based on divine omnibenevolence, it is said that “he cannot do immoral actions”. On the surface, at least, this doctrine appears to be in ...
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The contradiction between divine “omnipotence” and “omnibenevolence” is a major debate in philosophy of religion studies. Based on divine omnibenevolence, it is said that “he cannot do immoral actions”. On the surface, at least, this doctrine appears to be in conflict with the doctrine of divine omnipotence. An omnipotent being is one that can do all things possible; and, surely, it is possible to do immoral action. Nelson Pike discusses this matter in detail. He suggests as to how the various senses of “God cannot do moral actions” ought to be sorted out. Based on Pike’s suggestion, although the individual that is God has the ability to do immoral actions, His nature or character is such as to provide assurance that He will not act in this way. Joshua Hoffman maintains that Pike’s strategy for resolving the dilemma fails because it commits him to God’s being contingently omnibenevolent (not necessarily). In response, Pike accepts that God is not necessarily omnibenevolent and it’s the only way to resolve the dilemma. In Pike’s defense, the discrimination between “logical necessity” and “metaphysical necessity” should be noted. Further, we should distinguish between “the title of God” and “the individual of God”. “The title of God is benevolent” is metaphysically necessary while “The individual of God is contingently benevolent”. Therefore “God is necessarily benevolent” based on His title but this necessity doesn’t result in any limit for divine omnipotence.
Fateme Saeedi; Abdolrasoul Kashfi; Amirabbas Alizamani
Volume 8, Issue 1 , May 2019, , Pages 1-23
Abstract
Skeptical theism is one of the theistic responses to the evidential problem of evil. This approach which is included of different ideas, with emphasizing on human cognitive limitations and complicated axiological reality, casts doubt on the claim of gratuitous evil. This article is based on Bergmann’s ...
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Skeptical theism is one of the theistic responses to the evidential problem of evil. This approach which is included of different ideas, with emphasizing on human cognitive limitations and complicated axiological reality, casts doubt on the claim of gratuitous evil. This article is based on Bergmann’s idea, who is one of the prominent philosopher in this sphere. He challenges William Rowe’s inductive argument with his skeptical theses which are based on “representative” principle. Bergmann’s articles in this sphere are influential and highly controversial. One of the main objections to his idea is that his skeptical theses lead to moral impasse, both in theoretical (moral justification) and pragmatic aspect. This is against our approach in our everyday moral life. Since this position is not acceptable in everyday moral life, skeptical theism is not acceptable either. Although Bergmann accepts limitations in sphere of value, he doesn’t think it makes problem for skeptical theism. This article first introduce representative approach of Bergmann then considering objections and responses to them. At least it becomes clear that Bergmann’s solutions does not response objections rightly.
zahra karandish; Abdolrasoul Kashfi
Volume 3, Issue 1 , February 2015, , Pages 97-125
Abstract
The theory of middle knowledge is one of the responses to ‘theological fatalism’. The key point of theological fatalism is that if God is Omniscience and knows everything about the future, then the free agents cannot do anything but the one that God had known in eternity; so, they are not ...
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The theory of middle knowledge is one of the responses to ‘theological fatalism’. The key point of theological fatalism is that if God is Omniscience and knows everything about the future, then the free agents cannot do anything but the one that God had known in eternity; so, they are not free in their acts. The theory solves this difficulty through proving that God has pre-volition knowledge to all counterfactuals of freedom. But, William Hasker, the American philosopher of religion, believes that there are no true counterfactual of freedom; therefore, the theory of middle knowledge is not correct. In this article, based on Thomas Flint’s views, we show that some premises of Hasker’s argument is not true; consequently, he is not successful in refuting middle knowledge.
